While international diplomacy remained absorbed in calls for humanitarian ceasefires and stalled negotiations, radar systems and air traffic monitoring devices were detecting a very different kind of activity in the skies over East Africa and the Red Sea. The airports of Port Sudan, Massawa (Eritrea), and East Oweinat (Egypt) recorded, over a short period, an intense ballet of takeoffs and landings by military cargo aircraft whose engines ran without interruption.

Using open-access air traffic tracking data and flight logs, we have traced the operation of a vast « logistical air bridge » consisting of at least 27 suspect cargo flights between July 3 and August 8, 2026, originating primarily from Turkey, Belarus, and Egypt, intended to provide the Muslim Brotherhood forces in Port Sudan with crucial military and technological support at a critical moment.

The logistical hub: Port Sudan and Massawa at the center of the network

The flight destinations were not random; rather, they reflected a precise distribution of risk and the securing of supply lines:

1- Port Sudan (Main operational hub):

The coastal airport, serving as the temporary capital of the government and the army, received approximately 20 direct cargo flights. This airport terminal served as a nerve center for receiving shipments and heavy equipment, which were immediately integrated into the army’s logistical operations.

2- Massawa airport (Rear offloading platform):

The Eritrean coastal airport became an essential hub outside our direct control, where four significant cargo flights landed. This axis saw intense activity from two Belarusian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo aircraft that landed there frequently. Simultaneously, an Antonov An-12 transport aircraft remained permanently stationed on its runway to ensure tactical transport and distribution operations. Additionally, three cargo flights originating from Iran were observed landing during the same period.

3- East oweinat air base (Desert transit point):

Located in Egypt’s far southwest, this military base served as a crucial transit hub. On July 8, the base received two giant A400M transport aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Force, arriving directly from Tekirdağ Airport—the main operations center and export terminal for Baykar-Tek, manufacturer of the Bayraktar and Akinci drones. A Sukhoi SKF A321-231F cargo aircraft also landed at the same base, arriving from Port Sudan in late July.

Among the most notable routes was the activity of the Belarusian cargo aircraft IL-76TD, registered EW-567TH and operated by Rubystar. This aircraft alone made four direct flights between Minsk and Massawa during the last ten days of July.

However, its itinerary recorded on July 22, 2026, provided a concrete example of how these operations were managed:

First leg: Takeoff from Belarus and landing at Massawa Airport (unloading military equipment, likely munitions and technical matériel).
Second stopover: Takeoff from Massawa bound for Jeddah Airport in Saudi Arabia (carrying, according to surveillance sources, cargo intended for financial settlement and Sudanese gold to finance arms deliveries).
Third stopover: Takeoff from Jeddah and return to Minsk for refueling.

Technical support to break the ground stalemate

This intensive logistical flow was inseparable from the evolving military situation on the ground. The establishment of the air bridge coincided with the intensification of the large-scale attrition battles waged by the Sudanese army to break the siege of strategic areas, as well as with the escalation of fighting on the fronts of Khartoum, Kordofan, and El Fasher.

Secured access to technological components, precision Turkish drones, as well as electronic warfare platforms and heavy artillery munitions, gave the army a qualitative advantage that allowed it to target the Rapid Support Forces’ supply lines and paralyze their movements through continuous aerial surveillance.

This shifted the war from a phase of defense and shock containment to one of coordinated tactical offensive operations.

TheHatLady